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I. INTRODUCTION
In the administration of law, two of the murkiest areas are the
amount of administrative discretion allowed in carrying out legislative
mandates and the interpretation of statutes adopted by reference.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has given considerable attention to
both areas in the last fifteen years and Clemens v. Harvey1 presents a
clear illustration of the court's consistently conservative approach.
With "New Federalism"2 and the resulting transfer of funding and
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
1. 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994).
2. "New Federalism" refers to the movement aimed at deregulating many of the
federal programs and transforming them into block grants. Medicaid, which is
the program at issue in Clemens, is a prime example of a program which Congres-
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program control from the federal to the state level, how state courts
interpret federal statutes adopted by reference, and the amount of dis-
cretion state agencies are allowed in carrying out legislative policy,
becomes increasingly important.
In Clemens, the court continued its practice of applying the "Laza-
rus Rule" 3 to statutes adopted by specific reference. This rule holds
that statutes which adopt other statutes by specific reference are not
amended when the original statute is repealed or amended. 4 In Clem-
ens, the court also reiterated that the legislature cannot adopt by ref-
erence acts of Congress which will be passed in the future because
that would constitute an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature
to delegate its legislative authority to Congress.5
In Clemens, the court also maintained a watchful eye on agency
discretion. The court held that when the Department of Social Serv-
ices (DSS) eliminated eligibility for medical assistance for an entire
class of citizens, it exceeded its administrative discretion, because
DSS lacked the specific statutory authority to issue such a regula-
tion.6 The regulation was therefore found to be invalid.7
It is the function of the legislature to establish public policy in Ne-
braska through the enactment of statutes.8 Clemens held that exclud-
ing an entire class of citizens from medical assistance was a legislative
act because of the extent that it reflected the public policy of the
state.9 Under the state separation of powers doctrine, even if the leg-
islature wanted to delegate such a power to DSS, it could not do so
because that would have been an improper delegation of its own power
and prerogatives.1 0
sional leaders have proposed making a block grant without the federal mandates
that are attached to the money the federal government currently sends to the
states. Clemens directly resulted from the Reagan Era wave of federalism be-
cause it was a 1981 act which made the caretaker relative class optional rather
than mandatory under federal guidelines. This change precipitated the Depart-
ment of Social Services' action which led to the class action lawsuit in Clemens.
3. The Lazarus Rule is a statutory rule of construction applying to statutes adopted
by reference to existing statutes. Jeanelle R. Robson, Note, "Lazarus Come Forth,
And He That Was Dead Came Forth." An Examination of the Lazarus Rule:
Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 221 (1992).
4. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 932, 479 N.W.2d 772, 774 (1992).
5. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77,82,525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994). See also Ander-
son v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967); Smithberger v. Banning,
129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935).
6. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 82, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 82, 525 N.W.2d at 189. See Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. City of York, 212
Neb. 747, 326 N.W.2d 22 (1982).
9. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 82, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
10. Id. at 82-83, 525 N.W.2d at 189. See also State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb
766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991).
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This Note first presents the factual background of the caretaker
relative medical assistance program in Nebraska and the factual
background and procedural history of Clemens. Next, this Note ana-
lyzes the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding that statutes adopted by
reference are not altered when the original statutes are changed. It
examines whether changes are needed in Nebraska's approach to
adopting legislation by reference and concludes that the clarity of the
court's approach eliminates a need for change. Then, this Note exam-
ines what the court's refusal in Clemens to uphold a DSS regulation
reveals of the law on: 1) whether the legislature can adopt by refer-
ence future acts of Congress; 2) how much discretion the legislature
can delegate to administrative agencies; 3) the strict limits on admin-
istrative discretion in the policy-making area; and 4) the application of
Nebraska's Separation of Powers Doctrine. This Note concludes that
despite the legislature's passivity in protecting its power,"1 Clemens
resulted in a significant victory for the legislature's right to establish
the state's policy. Finally, this Note points out that Clemens v. Harvey
illustrates the continuing possibility of abuses of agency discretion, es-
pecially when lower income Nebraskans are concerned.12
II. BACKGROUND
Clemens v. Harveyl3 was a class action suit brought by Legal Serv-
ices agencies14 to prevent the Nebraska Department of Social Services
(DSS) from eliminating the class of "caretaker relatives" from eligibil-
ity for Medical Assistance (Medicaid) benefits.35 Caretaker relatives
are Nebraskans responsible for the care of children whose income and
resources are low enough to be eligible for Medicaid, but not low
11. There was not a strong reaction in the Legislature to DSS's usurpation of this
legislative decision. Prior to DSS's action to cut the caretaker relative class, one
senator, Appropriations Chairman Scott Moore, told a legislative committee, "[I]t
is my understanding [that cutting the caretaker relative class from Medicaid eli-
gibility] could be administratively done if the department so chose to do so." Ex-
clude Certain Persons from Eligibility for Medical Assistance, 1992: Hearing on
LB 1080 before the Committee on Health and Human Services, Nebraska Legisla-
ture, 92nd Legis., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Senator Scott Moore, February
20, 1992).
12. The Clemens class action was brought and successfully pursued by Nebraska's
three Legal Services agencies, Legal Services of Southeast Nebraska, Legal Aid
Society, Inc., and Western Nebraska Legal Services, working in cooperation with
the Nebraska Center for Legal Services. These agencies are now prohibited by
Congress from participating in such class action suits against government agen-
cies. Omnibus Rescissions and Appropriations Act, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. This
change leaves lower income Nebraskans bereft of legal aid to oppose abuses of
agency discretion that affect them.
13. 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994).
14. See supra note 12.
15. Welfare payments are "benefits [of] a matter of statutory entitlement" and cannot
be arbitrarily withdrawn. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).
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enough to qualify for a cash Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) grant.
Typically, these caretakers work full or part-time. Medicaid provides
an incentive for them to remain in the workplace. If they did not re-
ceive Medicaid as caretaker relatives, the expense of meeting their
medical needs might lead them to quit their jobs in order to lower
their incomes and qualify for Medicaid and ADC cash grants. Since
many people in this class have serious mental and physical health
problems, the importance of adequate health coverage in their lives
cannot be overstated.16
When the Medicaid program was established by federal statute in
1965, the caretaker relative class was one of the classes for whom cov-
erage was mandatory.17 If a state wished to receive federal matching
funds for its Medicaid program, the state was required to provide med-
ical benefits to non-grant ADC caretaker relatives.3S When the Ne-
braska Legislature established Nebraska's Medicaid program, it
adopted by reference "all applicable provisions"19 of Title XIX of the
Social Security Act of 1965,20 thereby incorporating mandatory Medi-
caid coverage for caretaker relatives into state law.
The federal government changed coverage for caretaker relatives
from mandatory to optional for states in 1981 when Title XIX of the
Social Security Act2l was amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act (OBRA).22 This change allowed states to drop Medicaid for
the caretaker relative class without losing eligibility for federal Medi-
caid matching funds. States that continued to cover the caretaker rel-
ative class received federal matching funds for that coverage.
The presence and level of federal matching funds is a crucial ele-
ment in the level of Medicaid services that a state can afford. In 1991,
the match rate for Medicaid from the federal government to cooperat-
ing states was 64%.23 In 1992, the level of federal matching funds was
cut to 61% and put on a sliding scale, linked to the comparative condi-
tion of the state's economy. 24 Given the dramatic growth in Medicaid
expenditures, which went from 4.2% of Nebraska's state budget in
1980 to 10% of the state budget in 1993,25 the cuts in federal matching
16. Brief of Appellants at 6, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(named appellants suffered from liver disease, hyperthyroidism, and severe
mental depression).
17. Title XIX of an Act of Congress identified as H.R. 6675, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
18. Brief of Appellants at 5, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
19. NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021 (Supp. 1994).
20. Title XIX of an Act of Congress identified as H.R. 6675, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
21. Id.
22. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), §§ 1905(a)(ii)(1981).
23. Moore, supra note 11.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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rates for Medicaid had a serious budgetary impact. Nebraska had to
appropriate an additional $18 million in fiscal year (FY) 1992-93 over
FY 91-92 in order to maintain a consistent level of Medicaid cover-
age. 26 , One solution to this growing budgetary problem was to cut
back or eliminate all optional Medicaid programs.
A number of bills were introduced in the Nebraska Legislature to
cut these optional programs, including coverage of the caretaker rela-
tive class. However, none of the bills were even advanced out of com-
mittee.27 In January 1993, the Nebraska Department of Social
Services responded to a projected budget deficit in the Medicaid pro-
gram by changing the Nebraska Administrative Code to eliminate
caretaker relatives from eligibility for Medicaid.28 This regulatory
change became effective on February 1, 1993, and was made in-
dependent of any state legislative action.29 Prior to taking this ad-
ministrative action, DSS estimated this change would affect only
about 345 adults and their families. 30 After the administrative cut
was made, DSS discovered that at least 5,700 people had their Medi-
caid coverage cut off.31
A year before the cut was made DSS Director Mary Dean Harvey
testified before the legislature about the effects of cutting people off
Medicaid. She said:
Now we know what... [the cuts are] going to translate into. If they don't
have this kind of coverage where they can access the preventive health care
that they're going to need, chances are they are more likely to end up in the
emergency rooms which is the worst place to try and get primary health care,
and/or the crisis will set upon them leading to longer hospitalizations. 32
In January 1993, just one year later, Director Harvey ordered care-
taker relative Medicaid coverage taken away.33
26. Id.
27. L.B. 792, 93rd Legis., 1st Sess. (1993); L.B. 1080, 92nd Legis., 2nd Sess. (1992).
28. Nebraska Department of Social Services Manual Letter 5-93 (on file with UN-L
Law College Library).
29. Legislative Bill 1080, which was introduced by Senator Scott Moore during the
1992 legislative session, would have ended Medicaid coverage for caretaker rela-
tives, but it was indefinitely postponed in committee and was not voted on by the
legislature.
30. Moore, supra note 11.
31. After the Supreme Court ruled that coverage for the caretaker relative class
should be reinstated, the class had grown to 8,900. Hearings on L.B. 203 and
L.B. 204 Before the Health and Human Services Committee, 94th Legis., 1st Sess.
(1995)(statement of Milo Mumgaard, Director, Nebraska Center for Legal
Services).
32. Exclude Certain Persons from Eligibility for Medical Assistance, 1992: Hearing
on LB 1080 before the Committee on Health and Human Services, Nebraska Leg-
islature, 92nd Legis., 2d Sess. (1992) (statement of Mary Dean Harvey, Director,
Nebraska Department of Social Services).
33. Department of Social Services Manual Letter 5-93.
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Affected parents filed a class action lawsuit. The named plaintiffs
in this class action suit were working parents of children who had re-
ceived Medicaid benefits as non-grant ADC caretaker relatives. Each
of the named plaintiffs had chronic medical needs such as liver disease
and severe mental depression.34 Due to the plaintiffs' low income,
they could not afford either the needed medical care or private medical
insurance. 35
The action was submitted to the Nebraska District Court upon the
parties' stipulation of facts.3 6 The trial was held on April 8, 1993. On
September 8, 1993, Judge Bernard J. McGinn certified the case as a
class action but held that the regulatory action had violated neither
state statutory provisions nor the Nebraska Constitution. 37 The par-
ties appealed directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court. The supreme
court reversed on both state statutory and Nebraska Constitutional
grounds.38
III. ANALYSIS OF CLEMENS
In Clemens, the Nebraska Supreme Court strongly defended the
legislature's right and ability to set policy from two different encroach-
ments on their policy-making prerogative-federal statutory changes
and state agency regulatory actions. Clemens also illustrates, as pre-
viously noted by the court,39 the problem of confusion that can be
caused when the legislature adopts by reference statutes that the
34. Brief of Appellants at 6, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994).
35. This raises a policy question. Given the serious medical needs of many caretaker
relatives and their low earning potential, their most rational option was often to
quit their jobs in order to qualify for ADC and, more importantly, Medicaid. If a
significant number of caretaker relatives chose this option, the savings antici-
pated by DSS would quickly evaporate. There is some evidence this happened
though there apparently was not a definitive study done by DSS on their "sav-
ings." The Nebraska Center for Legal Services estimated it cost DSS close to $4
million in ADC and Medicaid costs in order to save the $2 to $2.5 million a year
that maintaining the caretaker relative Medicaid program cost. Mumgaard,
supra note 31.
36. Clemens v. Harvey, No. 494 slip op. at 68 (3d Judicial Dist., Neb. Sept. 8, 1993).
37. Clemens v. Harvey, No. 494 slip op. at 68 (3d Judicial Dist., Neb. Sept. 8, 1993).
38. The appellants made four assignments of error: 1) DSS' 'after the fact" consulta-
tion with the Medical Care Advisory Committee did not satisfy the requirements
of the Social Security Act; 2) DSS' elimination of a class from Medicaid coverage
for budgetary reasons was contrary to the exclusive statutory method available to
DSS to reduce projected medical assistance budgetary deficits; 3) DSS' actions
exceeded its authority under state statutes; and 4) DSS' actions violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine of the Nebraska Constitution. The court found the third
and fourth assignments of error to be decisive in this case and did not address the
first and second assignments. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 79-80, 525
N.W.2d 185, 187-88 (1994).
39. School Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 210 Neb. 762, 770-71, 316 N.W.2d
767, 772 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 75:621
RESTRAINING AGENCY ACTION
originating body later amends or repeals.40 Clemens did not break
any new ground in the area of federal-state relationships. However,
in an era of swift and dramatic changes in cooperative state-federal
programs such as social services, it further clarified Nebraska law.
A. The Legislature Cannot Adopt by Reference Future Acts
of Congress.
In Anderson v. Tiemann4 1 and Smithberger v. Banning,42 the Ne-
braska Supreme Court dealt with whether the state legislature could
adopt an act that would be passed by Congress in the future. Smith-
berger held that such an act would be an unconstitutional delegation
of state legislative authority to Congress.4 3 Smithberger invalidated a
bill the legislature passed to spend federal relief funds which it antici-
pated Congress would soon appropriate. Since the Nebraska statute
adopted federal language that Congress had not yet passed, the court
held it unconstitutionally4 delegated state legislative authority to
Congress. 4 5 However, in Anderson, the court upheld a constitutional
amendment allowing Nebraska to tie its state income tax rate to the
federal rate, noting that the amendment did not mandate such delega-
tion; it only allowed it.46 Because the legislature retained the power
to make all state income tax decisions, a state law tying federal and
state rates together was not "an abdication of its functions."4 7 The
key factor was whether the state legislature retained full policy-mak-
ing authority rather than abdicating its authority to another law-mak-
ing body.
In the Medicaid program adopted by Nebraska in 1965, the Ne-
braska Legislature made the independent policy decision to adopt the
same guidelines set out in the 1965 Social Security Act.48 Nebraska's
adoption of parts of that statute by reference can be viewed as an exer-
cise in efficiency. It saved time and statute printing expense but did
not turn the legislature's authority over to Congress. 4 9
40. The court does not directly discuss this problem in Clemens, but a dispute over a
statute adopted by reference lies at the heart of this case.
41. 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967).
42. 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935).
43. Id. at 666, 262 N.W. at 500.
44. NEB. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1.
45. Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 666, 262 N.W. 492, 500 (1935).
46. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 399-400, 155 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1967).
47. Id. at 400, 155 N.W.2d at 327.
48. Title XX of th 1965 Social Security Act.
49. "[Wihen the legislature subsequently enacts legislation which makes related pre-
existing law applicable thereto, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge
of such preexisting legislation." School Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 210
Neb. 762, 765, 316 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1982).
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B. Statutes Adopted by Specific Reference Are Not Amended
When the Original Statute Is Amended.
As Anderson and other cases make clear,5O the legislature may in-
corporate specific federal statutes into state law. The Nebraska
Supreme Court's view of the consequences when the state adopts a
federal statute and the federal statute is later amended or repealed is
also clear. In 1982, the supreme court held: "Where one statute refers
to another and the latter is subsequently repealed, the statute re-
pealed, absent a contrary legislative intent, becomes a part of the one
making the reference and remains in force so far as the adopting stat-
ute is concerned."51 In so ruling, the court held this rule, first used by
the court in 1899 in Shull v. Barton,52 should still be given effect.
However, the court did not act unanimously.
Justice White, joined by Justice Krivosha, called Shull a "proce-
dural trap, which has no basis for logic."53 Pointing out that Shull
often requires an "exhaustive search"5 4 of the statutes, "many long
since repealed and replaced,"55 White unsuccessfully urged that Shull
be overruled.56 The debate of the court over this statutory rule of con-
struction was still raging a decade later when a dissent in Fisher v.
City of Grand Island57 led to it being renamed the "Lazarus Rule."58
Justice Shanahan, joined by Justice Grant, was as sharply critical of
the "Lazarus Rule" as Justice White had earlier been in School Dist.
No. 17.59 Justice Shanahan accused the majority of acting, "as a mag-
50. Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 400, 155 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1967). See School
Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 210 Neb. 762, 769-70, 316 N.W.2d 767,
771-72 (1982); State v. Workman, 186 Neb. 467, 469-70, 183 N.W.2d 911, 913
(1971); Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 784, 104 N.W.2d 227, 232
(1960).
51. School Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 210 Neb. 762, 765, 316 N.W.2d 767,
769-770 (1982).
52. 58 Neb. 741, 79 N.W. 732 (1899).
53. School Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State 210 Neb. 762, 770, 316 N.W.2d 767,
772 (1982).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Shelby County Comm'n v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 1979).
("This rule, however, leads only to confusion by requiring analysis of the general
law at some point in the past.").
57. 239 Neb. 929, 479 N.W.2d 772 (1992).
58. Justice Shanahan in his Fisher dissent wrote, "Not since 'Lazarus, come forth'
has there been such a summons for the dead to associate with the living, for this
court raises from Nebraska's dead statutes a procedure, killed by repeal in 1972
.... Id. at 933-34, 479 N.W.2d at 774-75 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
59. School Dist. No. 17, Douglas County v. State, 210 Neb. 762, 316 N.W.2d 767
(1982). In Fisher, Justice White also dissented with a one sentence referral to his
dissent in School Dist. No. 17. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 924, 933,
479 N.W.2d 772, 774 (1992)(White, J., dissenting).
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isterial mortician, caring for a body of law long since demised,"60 and
described the repealed statutes in question as "exist[ing] only in dust-
covered books in a dark, musty backroom of a law library, conducive to
raising mushrooms, or which have been placed beneath an uneven ta-
ble leg to stop wobbling."61
Justice Shanahan also noted that the Lazarus Rule "arguably
amounts to a denial of due process required by the Constitutions of the
United States and Nebraska."62 Due process requires the government
to give notice to individuals of governmental actions which affect fun-
damental interests.6 3 When such interests are affected by legislative
action, there is generally no notice question "because publication of a
statute is normally considered to put all individuals on notice of a
change in the law of the jurisdiction."64 Arguably, when a statute
adopts by reference statutes that are later repealed, citizens are not
given complete notice since the entire statute is not contained in a
current book of statutes and the due process requirement of notice has
not been met.65
Justice Shanahan met with no more success than Justice White
had ten years earlier. With the Nebraska Supreme Court firmly sup-
porting the Lazarus Rule, the coverage of the caretaker relative class,
mandated by the legislature in 1965 when it adopted "all applicable
provisions"66 of Title XIX would seem to have remained in effect until
repealed or amended by the Nebraska Legislature, regardless of any
action taken on the federal level. However, the Lazarus Rule only ap-
plies to statutes adopted by specific reference,67 not those adopted by
general reference.6S A general statutory reference is made to a gen-
eral body of law, such as a reference that reads "[in] compliance with
accepted tort principles."69 When a statute is adopted by general ref-
erence, the state law will change as the referenced statute is modified
60. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 938, 479 N.W.2d 772, 777
(1992)(Shanahan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 937, 479 N.W.2d at 777.
63. Id. at 937-38, 479 N.W.2d at 777.
64. JoHN E. NowAx & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8 at 552 (5th
ed. 1995).
65. Justice Shanahan notes this due process question, but his dissent does not rely
on it very heavily. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 937-38, 479
N.W.2d 772, 777 (1992)(Shanahan, J., dissenting).
66. NaB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021 (Supp. 1994).
67. "[The [specific] reference is ... one which refers to one or more named provisions
of another act . . . ." Horace Emerson Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth
While?, 25 Mni. L. REv. 261, 266 (1941).
68. Leach v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 107, 327 N.W.2d 615, 618
(1982).
69. Robson, supra note 3, at 226.
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or repealed.70 If the adopting reference to another statute refers to it
by specific statutory section numbers, it is adopted by specific refer-
ence, the Lazarus Rule then applies, and state law does not change
when the referenced statute is altered. 71
In Clemens, DSS argued that the law creating Medicaid 72 referred
to a general body of federal law and, therefore, was not specific refer-
ence legislation. DSS cited Leach v. State Department of Motor Vehi-
cles, 7 3 where the court stated: "We believe that when a statute adopts
the general law on a particular subject rather than a specific statute,
it adopts not only the existing law but later legislation on the sub-
ject."74 However, a close reading of the Nebraska Medicaid statute
does not support a general reference determination. The Nebraska
Medicaid statute adopted "all applicable provisions of Title XIX of an
Act of Congress identified as H.R. 6675, 89th Congress, approved July
30, 1965."75
When the court ruled a statute had been adopted by general refer-
ence in Leach, it pointed out, "no specific statute had been incorpo-
rated" into relevant law.76 Such was not the case in the Nebraska
statute dealing with caretaker relatives.77 It incorporated all applica-
ble provisions of a specific statute, Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
on the specific subject of Medicaid. Title XIX of the Social Security Act
is clearly a specific statute, so DSS was left with the much weaker
proposition that by "accepting... all applicable provisions"78 of a stat-
ute, the legislature was adopting a general, rather than a specific,
body of law.79
The Nebraska Legislature was clear about the specific statute it
adopted. The adopted federal statute clearly defined both the class of
caretaker relatives and the eligibility of this class for Medicaid.80 Be-
70. Leach v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 106-07, 327 N.W.2d 615,
618 (1982).
71. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 935, 479 N.W.2d 772, 775 (1992)
(Shanahan, J., dissenting). See Leach v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb.
103, 107, 327 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1982). See also Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77,
81, 525 N.W.2d 185, 188 (1994).
72. NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021 (Reissue 1990).
73. 213 Neb 103, 327 N.W.2d 615 (1982).
74. Id. at 107 (citing State v. District Court (Delaware County), 114 N.W.2d 317
(Iowa 1962)).
75. NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021 (Reissue 1990).
76. Leach v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 107, 327 N.W.2d 615, 618
(1982).
77. NEB. RE-V. STAT. § 68-1021.
78. NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1021 (Reissue 1990).
79. DSS also noted that Clemens was similar to Leach and differed from School Dist.
No. 17 in that the statute in question was not repealed, but was amended. How-
ever, it is difficult to see how this helps DSS' case. The court makes note of this
difference in Leach, but does not discuss the significance of this factor.
80. Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et. seq. (1995).
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cause the Nebraska Legislature has not amended this statute, the eli-
gibility of the caretaker class for Medicaid has not changed.
Furthermore, there was no showing of legislative intent to change the
status of the caretaker relative class. The legislature had 11 years
since the 1981 passage of OBRA8s to exercise the state option to end
coverage of the caretaker class. A number of bills to do so were intro-
duced, but none passed.82
The defeat of these bills cannot be used to define the legislature's
full intent. However, they clearly indicate legislative support for con-
tinued caretaker relative coverage. As the court noted in State ex rel.
Spire v. Stodola,83 if the legislature had wanted the rule later adopted
by the affected state agency,84 "[ilt clearly could have included [that]
provision .... "85
The legislature has responded to other Medicaid eligibility changes
in federal law. For example, Nebraska statutes have been amended to
include coverage of low-income newborns born after October 1, 198486
(Ribicoff children).87 The legislature's addition of this new class for
Medicaid coverage demonstrates its retention of control over which
classes of Nebraskans are eligible for Medicaid. Following DSS' logic,
it would have been unnecessary for the legislature to pass a law ad-
ding the Ribicoff class for coverage since the federal addition of a new
class would automatically mandate state coverage.
In Clemens, DSS also argued that because Title XIX is amended
"literally every year,"88 to read the caretaker relative statute8 9 as a
specific reference statute would "irrational[ly]" require the state stat-
ute to be amended every year.90 However, the Nebraska Legislature
would not be under such an obligation. It would only be required to
adopt legislation necessary to maintain Nebraska's eligibility in the
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 42
U.S.C. § 1905(a)(ii).
82. Both Legislative Bill 1080 in the 92nd Legislature, 2nd Session and Legislative
Bill 792 in the 93rd Legislature, 1st Session would have eliminated Medicaid cov-
erage for the caretaker relative class. Both were indefinitely postponed in
committee.
83. 228 Neb. 107, 421 N.W.2d 436 (1988).
84. In Stodola, the Department of Public Institutions was the state agency.
85. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 110, 421 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1988).
86. L.B. 1127, § 4, 88th Legis., 2nd Sess. (1984). This class was added by specific
reference: "all individuals less than twenty-one years of age who are eligible
under section 1905(a) of the Social Security Act as amended."
87. The name "Ribicoff children" comes from its chief sponsor, Senator Abraham Rib-
icoff, (D-Conn.). The class includes children from families earning between 100%
and 133% of the ADC income standard.
88. Brief of Appellee at 14, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
89. NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021.
90. Brief of Appellees at 14, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
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Medicaid program, and optional changes which the legislature
deemed fit Nebraska's policy goals. Other statutory changes made by
Congress to the Medicaid program would be no more important to Ne-
braska than the changes Iowa and Utah make in their Medicaid pro-
grams "literally every year."91
DSS characterized as "absurd" a reading of the law that included
in the caretaker relative statute, Nebraska Revised Statute 68-1021,
all applicable guidelines from the 1965 version of Title XIX, but none
of the changes Congress later made that the Nebraska legislature did
not adopt.92 DSS based this conclusion on the presumption that the
legislature intended a rational result from the statutes.93 However,
DSS' argument suffered from a lack of specificity. What part of that
reading of 68-1021 was irrational?
*That the Nebraska Legislature would want to debate and pass specific
changes in the Medicaid program rather than have Nebraska automatically
accede to program changes passed by Congress?94
*That the guidelines adopted thirty years ago and never repealed by the
legislature are still valid law?
*That when the legislature adopted all "applicable" Medicaid provisions of
Title XIX of the 1965 Act 9 5 it meant to adopt those provisions and nothing
more?
The value of the contribution made by Clemens v. Harvey96 in
clearing up the areas of Nebraska law covering federal-state coopera-
tive programs is made clear by the Supremacy Clause argument that
DSS raised in its Clemens brief.97 DSS correctly pointed out that the
caretaker relative class of Medicaid, which had been mandatory for
participating states since 1965, was made optional by the 1981 Budget
Reconciliation Act. But DSS went on to argue that "to force"98 the
state of Nebraska to cover this optional Medicaid class would violate
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.99 DSS' reasoning was
that if Congress made a program optional for states, it would be un-
constitutional for a state to continue to offer that formerly mandatory,
but newly optional, program. Not only did this reasoning reveal a
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991); Corn-
husker Christian Children's Home v. Dep't of Social Services, 229 Neb. 837, 841,
429 N.W.2d 359, 362 (1988); Dugdale of Nebraska v. First State Bank, 227 Neb.
729, 420 N.W.2d 273 (1988).
94. That action is the only constitutional option. See Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb.
393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967). See generally Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb.
651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935).
95. NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1021 (Supp. 1994).
96. 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994).
97. Brief of Appellees at 12, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
98. Id.
99. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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unique view of the U.S. Constitution and federalism, but it also failed
to deal with appellants' argument. Appellants were not arguing that
federal law required the State of Nebraska to provide this Medicaid
program. On the contrary, appellants agreed that the change in fed-
eral law made this program optional. Their position was that state
law, adopted in 1965 and unchanged since then, included caretaker
relatives as a statutorily eligible Medicaid class.100 In such a situa-
tion, the Supremacy Clause was irrelevant. Federal law made the
class optional for state coverage. State law still mandated the class's
coverage.' 0
C. Only Limited Administrative Discretion Can Be
Delegated by the Legislature
A common question concerning the separation of powers is: how
much power can the legislature delegate to administrative agencies to
fill in the details of the larger policy decisions that the legislature
makes? In a practical sense, it is impractical and undesirable for the
legislative branch to concern itself with regulatory minutia. As Davis
and Pierce noted in their Administrative Law Treatise, "Discretion is
inevitable in all agencies at all levels of government.". 0 2
But there is an extensive gray area within this grant of discretion-
ary area concerning what is an administrative issue and what is
within the realm of policy questions that must be left to the legisla-
ture.'0 3 It is an important battleground for power between the execu-
tive and legislative branches, and the courts serve as referees. The
Nebraska Supreme Court has not been an intrusive referee. On the
100. Brief of Appellants at 19, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77,525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
101. An additional DSS argument reflects the same unique view of the principles of
federalism. Their brief complains, "One can be certain that if, .... , coverage for
medically needy caretaker relatives had been optional and not covered in Ne-
braska prior to 1981, and then became mandatory due to the 1981 federal OBRA
amendments, the Appellants would have argued early and often that federal law
is supreme and that such coverage became mandatory." Brief of Appellees at 15,
Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994) (No. A-93-0898). This
statement significantly mischaracterizes federal-state cooperative programs.
What appellants would have answered in that hypothetical situation was that
the State of Nebraska had a choice between funding coverage of the caretaker
class or losing all Federal Medicaid matching funds. Even in that "mandatory"
situation, the Supremacy Clause would not force the State of Nebraska to cover a
specific Medicaid class.
102. 3 KENNETH C. DAvIs & RicHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 17.1 (3d ed. 1994).
103. As Mark Fondacaro notes, procedural fairness is often more difficult to deliver in
social welfare systems than in some other administrative areas. Mark R. Fonda-
caro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Social Science: Due Process and Procedural
Justice In The Context of National Health Care Reform, 72 DENy. U. L. REv. 303,
320-21 (1995).
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question of how far the legislature should be able to go in filling in
administrative details, the court holds, "[T]he legislature has a wide
discretion, and the court should be reluctant to interfere with such
discretion."o 4 This is an eminently reasonable approach given the
practical limitations on a part-time legislature in dealing, in any de-
tail, with any of the thousands of issues that come before it.
Courts have also generally given agencies a large amount of discre-
tion as to how they may operate within statutory limits. For example,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held:
If... Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute .... Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.10 5
However, the Supreme Court also noted in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca
that it was necessary to defer to an agency only if tools of statutory
construction failed.106
In Nebraska, the court has also recognized the need for agency dis-
cretion. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund,
the court noted that the modem tendency is toward more liberal
grants of discretion given the increasing "complexity of economic and
governmental conditions."o 7 As early as 1964, the court also ex-
pressed skepticism about whether a legislature could "prescribe all
the rules and regulations necessary for a specialized agency to accom-
plish the legislative purpose."10
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has arguably been more
restrictive than the U.S. Supreme Court. Nebraska's highest court
has consistently held that "an administrative agency may not employ
its rulemaking power to modify, alter, or enlarge provisions of a stat-
ute which it is charged with administering."109 Given this holding,
DSS was faced with limited discretion in deciding whether Medicaid
covered a specific class of people. Under Nebraska's Medicaid statute,
an administrative action eliminating an entire class from eligibility
would seem to "modify, alter, or enlarge"11o statutory provisions.
Once the court found Nebraska's statute to be a specific reference stat-
104. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, 204 Neb. 445,464,283
N.W.2d 12, 24 (1979).
105. Chevron, U.SA. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
106. 480 U.S. 421, 446-48 (1987).
107. 204 Neb. 445, 465, 283 N.W.2d 12, 24 (1979).
108. School Dist. No. 8 of Sherman County v. State Bd. of Educ., 176 Neb. 722, 726,
127 N.W.2d 458, 461 (1964).
109. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 110, 421 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1988);
Beatrice Manor v. Department of Health, 219 Neb. 141, 145, 362 N.W.2d 45, 49
(1985); County of Dodge v. Department of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 354, 355 N.W.2d
775, 780 (1984).
110. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 110, 410 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1988).
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ute that expressly mandated that caretaker relatives was an eligible
class, it had to hold that DSS action altered statutory provisions in an
unacceptable manner.
However, even if the court had agreed with DSS' argument that
federal Medicaid provisions were adopted by general reference, the
court should have found in favor of the plaintiffs. The 1981 changes in
the Social Security Act made coverage of caretaker relatives optional
by states. This federal statutory change did not move the decision on
whether to cover this class into the area of agency discretion."'1 A
change in the federal legislation making a program optional left the
decision of whether coverage should have been withdrawn to the legis-
lative branch."12
DSS does have considerable discretion in writing rules and regula-
tions for social services. DSS argued that eliminating a class from eli-
gibility for Medicaid was "clearly within the bounds delineated by the
Nebraska Supreme Court as proper . . . for the exercise of discre-
tion."1 3 In making this argument, DSS argued caretaker relatives
were not specified along with other classes in Nebraska's statute cre-
ating Medicaid,114 nor were they included in the referenced Social Se-
curity Act provision. Therefore, DSS argued that it had the discretion
to eliminate coverage of this class because it was not statutorily
mandated."15
However, the federal statute did not use general language such as -
states shall provide medical assistance for all persons it deems neces-
sary. It specifically defined the class covered as caretaker relatives as
"individuals who are- (ii) relatives specified in § 406(b)(1) with whom
a child is living if such child, except for § 406(a)(2), is (or would, if
needy, be) a dependent child under Title IV."1-6
111. "Although persons eligible for AFDC are automatically eligible for medicaid, per-
sons who do not qualify for welfare assistance may nevertheless still qualify for
medicaid." Perez v. Lavine, 412 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
112. DSS argued that the federal government had dictated to Nebraska that the eligi-
bility for benefits of an entire class of citizens (a legislative decision) should be
left to agency discretion. Giving either the federal government or state executive
branch agencies such legislative power has been found unconstitutional by the
Nebraska Supreme Court. See generally State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb.
107, 421 N.W.2d 436 (1988); County of Dodge v. Department of Health, 218 Neb.
346, 355 N.W.2d 775 (1984); Smithberger v. Banning, 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W.
492 (1935).
113. Brief of Appellees at 18, Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994)
(No. A-93-0898).
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1020(1) (Reissue 1990).
115. This argument rests on the proposition that the 1981 federal OBRA amended
Nebraska's statutory law dealing with Medicaid.
116. 1965 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 305, 379; Social Security Act § 1905(a)(i).
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D. Agency Discretion Cannot Intrude on Legislative Powers.
There is no doubt that the legislature can delegate to an adminis-
trative agency the power to make rules and regulations to implement
state policy.117 However, the agency's rule-making authority is lim-
ited to the powers delegated to it by the statute it is administering.118
While DSS had been given the statutory authority to promulgate rules
and regulations "as to medical services and benefits,"119 there was no
applicable statutory language which alluded to DSS' authority to elim-
inate entire classes from Medicaid coverage.1 20 A change in federal
law could not insert such agency discretion without first being adopted
by the state.
In addition, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held: "In order to be
valid, a rule or regulation must be consistent with the statute under
which the rule or regulation is promulgated."121 Given the legisla-
ture's adoption of caretaker relatives as a Medicaid class in 1965, and
its failure to modify or repeal such coverage, it is difficult to see how
DSS' denial of coverage to caretaker relatives was anything but a di-
rect contradiction of the applicable statute. Clemens, therefore,
closely followed the reasoning in Dodge and Stodola, in which the
supreme court ruled invalid agency regulations which directly "con-
travene[d] the statute which the agency is obliged to administer."'122
In Dodge, the Nebraska Health Care Certificate of Need Appeal
Panel granted a certificate of need based on criteria that was not re-
quired under the Certificate of Need Panel's enabling statute. Dodge
did differ from Clemens because in Dodge the administrative action
also differed from regulations created by the Nebraska Department of
Health, the overseeing executive department. The court pointed to
differences with both legislative and executive guidelines in Dodge to
hold that the panel exceeded its discretion.123
Clemens is closer to Stodola than Dodge because it involved only a
difference with legislative guidelines, not executive guidelines as well.
In Stodola, the legislature authorized the Department of Public Insti-
tutions (DPI) to adopt appropriate regulations for making determina-
tions about ability to pay for services. The state statute specifically
stated the factor of "taxable income reportable under Nebraska
117. County of Dodge v. Department of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 355 N.W.2d 775 (1984).
118. Id.
119. NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1021 (Reissue 1990).
120. DSS' delegated authority for the Nebraska Medicaid program is found at NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 68-1018 to 68-1036 (Reisssue 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1994).
121. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb 107, 110, 421 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1988).
122. County of Dodge v. Dep't of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 355 N.W.2d 775, 780 (1984);
State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 410 N.W.2d 436 (1988).
123. County of Dodge v. Dep't of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 354, 355 N.W.2d 775, 780
(1984).
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law."124 DPI promulgated a regulation that required the furnishing of
financial information "includ[ing] but.., not necessarily limited to a
copy of their state tax return and a completed financial question-
naire."31 25 The court found the rule to be invalid because it "has
promulgated a rule... which enables that agency to exercise powers
beyond those actually delegated to it by the Legislature."126
DSS' actions in Clemens were arguably even more flagrant than
the DPI regulations which the court held to be improper in Stodola.
Stodola involved only the amount of documentation affected parties
had to supply. DSS in Clemens summarily eliminated an entire class
of people from Medicaid coverage. Given this precedent, the court's
holding in Clemens was no surprise, "[W]e do not find that DSS has
been given the specific authority to unilaterally eliminate coverage to
the class in question."12 7
E. Separation of Powers Doctrine
The court in Clemens also held that DSS, a part of the executive
branch, had violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine of the Ne-
braska Constitution because excluding an entire class from Medicaid
was a legislative act.128 The Nebraska Constitution states:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct de-
partments, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person or collection
of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted.1 2 9
The Nebraska Supreme Court has strictly guarded against "one
branch of government... encroaching on the duties and prerogatives
of the others or from improperly delegating its own duties and prerog-
atives."13 0 It has called this division "the beam from which our sys-
tem of checks and balances is suspended."131
The power to make public policy and set the standards for carrying
out that policy is a legislative power.132 As the court held in Ralston
v. Turner: "Within constitutional limits, the Legislature is the sole
judge as to what laws should be enacted for the protection and welfare
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-368 (Reissue 1981).
125. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 109, 421 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1988)(em-
phasis added).
126. Id. at 110, 421 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1988).
127. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 82, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
128. Id. at 83, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
129. NEB. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
130. Otey v. State, 240 Neb. 813, 825, 485 N.W.2d 153, 163 (1992); State ex rel. Spire
v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 773, 472 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1991); State ex rel. Meyer v.
State Board of Equalization &Assessment, 185 Neb. 490, 176 N.W.2d 920 (1970).
131. State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 773, 472 N.W.2d 403, 408 (1991).
132. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. City of York, 212 Neb. 747, 757,326 N.W.2d 22, 28
(1982).
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of the people."133 In Clemens, the court held that not only had the
legislature "not attempted"13 4 to delegate to DSS the power to elimi-
nate a class of persons from Medicaid coverage, it also held that "the
Legislature cannot delegate such powers."135
While the Nebraska Court approaches the area of constitutional
separation of powers on a case by case basis,136 it has attempted to
maintain a rigid division between the branches. In State ex rel. Spire
v. Conway, the court held a state senator could not serve in the legisla-
ture while retaining a state college teaching job in the executive
branch.137 In State ex rel. Meyer,13s the court found that the legisla-
ture has total authority over appropriations, but once the appropria-
tions are made, the authority shifts to the executive branch.13 9 Both
decisions illustrate the court's determination to maintain a division
between the branches even when, as in Conway, the affected party
arguably had a policy-making role in only one branch and held a non-
supervisory position in the other branch.
In comparison to Conway, Clemens was a simple separation of pow-
ers question. DSS' action had the effect of altering or repealing a leg-
islative act. The legislature had worked within its constitutional
power to determine which classes of low-income Nebraskans were eli-
gible for Medicaid. DSS then vetoed the legislature's decision as it
affected the caretaker relative class. The court's ruling in Clemens is
consistent with Hagemeister140 when it ruled: "It is beyond the power
133. State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 559, 4 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1942). See
also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 113 (1984) ("Legislative power is the power to
enact laws or to declare what the law shall be. .. ."); Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v.
City of York, 212 Neb. 747, 757, 326 N.W.2d 22, 28 (1982) ("In general,... it is
the function of the Legislature by the enactment of statutes to declare what the
law is.").
134. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 83, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
135. Id., 525 N.W.2d at 189 (emphasis added).
136. State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 490,
500, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (1970).
137. 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991).
138. State ex rel. Meyer v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 185 Neb. 490,
176 N.W.2d 920 (1970).
139. DSS argued in Clemens that State ex rel. Meyer supports the proposition that,
once the legislature has appropriated state funds, the executive branch can spend
that money as it sees fit. Under this logic, DSS could have eliminated the care-
taker relative class from coverage under its executive powers. The court dis-
missed this claim without comment since the logical extension of this proposition
would reduce the legislature's appropriations power to control over only the ag-
gregate amount of appropriations since the executive branch could then make
whatever changes it wanted. It should be noted that this interpretation would, if
accepted by the court, have signaled a tremendous shift in power from the legisla-
tive to the executive branch.
140. State ex rel. Johnson v. Hagemeister, 161 Neb. 475, 484, 73 N.W.2d 625, 631
(1956).
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of the executive or administrative bodies to... interfere, with or limit
powers conferred on the Legislature by the Constitution."'14
F. Who Will Check Administative Discretion?
Clemens is an apt illustration of why executive agencies should not
be given the discretion DSS argued for in this case. If an executive
agency were free to eliminate programs without legislative approval,
it would be impossible to either depend on legislatively created pro-
grams or to consistently enforce legislative standards. But Clemens
raises an important question of who is responsible for holding admin-
istrative agencies accountable for not exceeding their discretion.
Courts can act as referees, but only if a party with standing brings a
case before them.
The Clemens decision was the result of a class action suit brought
by four Legal Services agencies, Legal Services of Southeast Ne-
braska, Legal Aid Society, Inc., Western Nebraska Legal Services, and
the Nebraska Center for Legal Services.142 Legislation recently
passed by Congress combines a significant cut in the Legal Services
budget143 with a prohibition on class action suits filed against any
governmental entity.144 The passage of this legislation insures that
Legal Services agencies will be unable to take on a case like Clemens
in the future.
When governmental agencies exercise improper discretion, there
are often private parties with the resources to defend their own rights,
and to restore the proper balance among branches of government.
However, when governmental actions affect the economically disad-
vantaged, the ability of the affected people to defend their rights, even
if their legal position is unassailable, is limited. Congressional action
to gag or destroy Legal Services will eliminate one of the few legal
allies of the economically downtrodden.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Clemens decision, there were probably few people who
expected the conservative Nebraska Supreme Court to reverse the dis-
trict court's decision and support a class action suit brought by impov-
erished parents against the Nebraska Department of Social Services.
However, a careful reading of the court's decisions indicates it was
probably an easy case for them to decide. In Clemens, the court con-
141. Id.
142. The Nebraska Center for Legal Services was terminated on December 31, 1995.
143. In FY 1996, the national Legal Services budget was slashed. Jon Newberry, Tem-
porary Reprieve for the LSC After a Tough Fight, Legal Agency Gets 1996 Funds,
But Future is Unclear, ABA J. Dec 1995 at 18.
144. Omnibus Rescissions and Appropriations Act, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat.
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tinued its conservative approach to interpreting statutes adopted by
reference, its close watch over the use of administrative discretion,
and its vigilant protection of the separation of powers. The impor-
tance of Clemens was not that it broke new ground or pointed the
court in a new direction, but that it clarified and strengthened the
court's approach to some important questions of statutory interpreta-
tion and separation of powers.
In Leach,145 the court clearly differentiated between statutes
adopted by general reference and those adopted by specific reference,
and held that specific reference statutes were not altered when the
original statute was changed. But the court's stance blurred in
Fisher.146 As Justice Shanahan pointed out in his dissent, the refer-
ence statute in question did not contain a specific statutory reference
to the justice of peace statute so, if it followed Leach, the court in
Fisher should have held the repeal of the justice of peace statute (the
reference statute) also repealed its effect on the adopting statute.' 47
The court did not do so. Clemens gave the court an opportunity to
reiterate its holding that specific reference statutes are not amended
when the original statute changes.148
However, Clemens also demonstrates the confusion that can result
when statutes are adopted by reference, then amended or repealed
over time. As the dissent in School Dist. No. 17149 illustrates, this is
not a new or unique problem. It is a problem which can be easily
solved. Statutes that are adopted by reference can be reprinted in
their entirety, thereby eliminating "exhaustive search[es]"150 and
clarifying legislative intent. But as a Wisconsin decision pointed out,
incorporating statutes by reference has its merits:
[The] [gireatest advantage gained by incorporating terms by reference is
that the new bill may be shortened with two practical benefits, reduction in
the volume of the statute books, and application of established precepts of
proven worth to a new situation with a minimum of legislative tinkering.
Thus, with [few words]... it incorporate[s] a multitude of descriptions of...
conduct. 1
5 1
The trade-off is simple. Nebraska can opt for efficiency and avoid re-
printing voluminous statutes adopted by reference or it can opt for
clarity and adopt statutes word for word, instead of by reference.
145. Leach v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 327 N.W.2d 615 (1982).
146. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 479 N.W.2d 772 (1992).
147. Id. at 935-36, 479 N.W.2d at 775-76.
148. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 81-82, 525 N.W.2d 185, 188-89 (1994).
149. School Dist. No. 17 of Douglas County v. State, 210 Neb. 762, 770-71, 316 N.W.2d
767, 772 (1982).
150. Id. at 770, 316 N.W.2d at 772.
151. Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 262 N.W.2d 218, 224-25 (1978).
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How much confusion is caused by statutes adopted by reference?
Situations similar to Fisherl52 will occasionally recur, where the legis-
lature fails to amend every affected section of the statutes, and the
courts are left to wrestle with determining actual legislative intent.
But in other situations, Clemens will prove helpful in clarifying the
situation. When the legislature refers to a specific statute, that stat-
ute becomes part of the state law and remains state law until the leg-
islature makes a change. This clarification reduces the need to
foreswear the useful legislative device of adopting legislation by
reference.
Clemens was not an important case in the area of how much discre-
tion an administrative agency can assume in executing legislative
acts. DSS did not present a colorable claim that the legislature in-
tended to allow DSS the discretion to eliminate entire classes of
Nebraskans from coverage by specific social services programs. Dodge
County,153 Stodola,154 and Beatrice Manor155 are much more impor-
tant in charting the boundaries of agency discretion in Nebraska.
However, Clemens is important in helping to set the parameters
for what the Legislature cannot delegate to agency discretion. Inas-
much as establishing the policies and eligibility for specific govern-
ment programs is clearly a legislative role, the court has been clear
and consistent. "The Nebraska Constitution... prohibits one branch
of government... from improperly delegating its own duties and pre-
rogatives."156 There will always be gray areas of agency discretion,
but eliminating an entire program, or an entire class of citizens from
program participation is not in a gray area. The court was clear
in Clemens: "The Legislature cannot delegate to DSS the authority
to eliminate caretaker relatives from eligibility for medical
assistance."157
This is an important ruling given the times in which we live. As
the federal government cuts back its state aid, there will be increasing
pressures on state legislatures to cut social programs, many of them
with significant constituent support. The politically easy way out for
the legislature would be to give executive agencies the authority to
make those unpopular cuts. The court held in Clemens that the Ne-
braska legislature does not have that option. It was not only the right
decision on constitutional grounds, it was the right decision to make
for democratic reasons. The legislature, not agency bureaucrats, is
152. Fisher v. City of Grand Island, 239 Neb. 929, 479 N.W.2d 772 (1992).
153. County of Dodge v. Department of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 355 N.W.2d 775 (1984).
154. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 421 N.W.2d 436 (1988).
155. Beatrice Manor v. Department of Health, 219 Neb. 141, 362 N.W.2d 45 (1985).
156. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 82, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994). See State ex rel.
Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991).
157. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 83, 525 N.W.2d 185, 189 (1994).
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elected to set our state's policy. In Clemens, the court rightly refused
to let it shirk that duty.
The court's reliance on the Separation of Powers Doctrine of the
state constitutionl5S in Clemens was also important. If the court had
limited its decision to holding that the legislature had not delegated
the power to DSS to eliminate caretaker relatives from eligibility, the
legislature could have attempted to give DSS or other agencies the
power to eliminate programs. The court's reliance on constitutional
grounds clearly forecloses this option.
Despite Clemens' clear restraint on administrative discretion, in its
aftermath we are left with a disturbing question. Who will make sure
that questionable exercises of administrative discretion are chal-
lenged in the courts? It is clear that the action taken by DSS was
improper under Nebraska law. The consequences of allowing such an
action to stand were serious. On an individual level, it is not an exag-
geration to call it a matter of life and death. When thousands of
Nebraskans were eliminated from Medicaid, many of them could no
longer afford prescribed medication for conditions such as heart and
kidney disease and psychiatric problems. Death or permanent disabil-
ity were possible results. On a governmental level, DSS altered the
separation of powers by usurping a legislative power. The stakes are
high. In the wake of Clemens, we need to ask, now that Congress has
tied Legal Services' hands, who will act to see that justice is done?
Jeffery R. Kirkpatrick '97
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